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COMMENTS
HEADING DOWN THE WRONG ROAD?:
WHY DEREGULATING AMATEURISM
MAY CAUSE FUTURE LEGAL
PROBLEMS FOR THE NCAA
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), organized in 1905
to protect the safety of football players, 1 has enjoyed outstanding achievement
and development throughout the twentieth century. With this success has
come a multitude of rules designed to protect the "amateur" nature of
collegiate athletics.2 However, in January 2001, NCAA Division II passed a
proposal that drastically changed the association's longtime stance on what it
meant to be an "amateur" athlete. As opposed to the NCAA's long established
view that an amateur athlete was one who has never received payment for
participation in a sport, 3 under NCAA Division II's new Bylaws, this is no
longer the case.
For the first time in its history, the NCAA will allow former professional
athletes to participate in intercollegiate sports. While unlikely to ever occur,
under Division II's new Bylaws, players like Kobe Bryant or Tracy McGrady,
who entered the professional ranks directly from high school, could play
professional basketball for up to three years, yet attend college and have at
least one year of intercollegiate eligibility remaining. While the NCAA cites
several reasons for the change that may have good intentions behind it, one
must ask if the change may have some later, unintended consequences.
This article discusses the possible legal impact these measures may have
on the NCAA. Section One will address the radical move that Division II
initiated, which was passed with overwhelming support at its 2001
Convention. Section Two discusses the amateurism deregulation proposals
1. Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 206, 209 (1990).
2. See generally NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 2000-01 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL
(2000) [hereinafter NCAA DMSION I MANUAL]. The Manual is well over 400 pages long.
3. According to the 2000-01 NCAA Division I Manual, any person who receives pay for athletic
performance, signs a contract to play a professional sport, or signs a contract with an agent, among
other things, loses his amateur status. NCAA DIviSION I MANUAL, supra note 2, § 12.1.1.
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that Division I is considering and notes the key differences between these
proposals and the Bylaws passed by Division II. Section Three will include
outlines of two legal concepts-the law of private associations and antitrust
law-and will discuss how courts have historically applied each to challenges
of NCAA regulations promoting amateurism. Section Four will apply both the
law of private associations and antitrust law to Division I's amateurism
deregulation proposals to show what potential impact these proposals may
have on the NCAA. Included within Section Four will be an antitrust analysis
of the proposed regulations for Division I as compared to the regulations
passed by Division II. Finally, in Section Five this article concludes by
recommending that Division I should either not change its Bylaws, or enact a
proposal similar to Division II so future legal problems are avoided.
I. THE MOVE TO DEREGULATE AMATEURISM: WHY DIVISION II CHANGED
AMERICA'S PERCEPTION OF AMATEURISM IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS
A. The Changing Face ofAmateurism
The idea of amateurism began in England and was originally a way to
distinguish participants in sports among social classes.4 This definition carried
on to the United States as the nation developed and was first synonymous with
the "elite establishment, 5 a meaning that carried through the Civil War.
Therefore, an athlete's status was determined by his personal wealth and social
class-athletes who were members of the "leisure class" were considered
amateurs whereas those of the "working class" were thought of as
professionals. 6
However, since that time, America's perception of amateurism has been
altered. Today, the concept of amateurism in America is directly linked with
money; if you are paid to participate in athletics, you are considered a
professional. Only those who participate for "free" maintain their amateur
status. 7 Division I's current definition for amateurism is found in the NCAA
Division I Manual, which states:
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their
participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the
physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student
4. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, DIVISION I AMATEURISM DEREGULATION PROPOSALS
2 (2000) [hereinafter NCAA DIVISION I PROPOSALS].
5. Id. (quoting Letter from Bobby Dodd, President, Amateur Athletic Union).
6. Id.
7. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 55 (4th ed. 2000).
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participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation and student-
athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and
commercial enterprises.8
B. Division II's Historic Decision
By enacting a series of changes to its Bylaws, NCAA Division II
(Division II) defined amateurism in a way much different than that which had
been used for many years. The changes made at the Division II level will
allow prospective student-athletes (PSAs)9 to accept prize money, as well as
sign and play professionally before entering college, yet still be able to
compete in intercollegiate athletics. 10 The Bylaws, which were passed by a
vote of 217-29 (with two abstaining votes), 11 moved away from the NCAA's
prior focus on money in determining an athlete's amateur status 12 and moved
towards rules focusing on the "[w]elfare of the [p]rospective [s]tudent-
[a]thlete" and "[c]ompetitive [e]quity."' 13 In justifying the change, Division II
believed that since a PSA does not receive a competitive advantage by being
drafted, accepting prize money based on finish, or signing a professional
8. NCAA DIVIsION I MANUAL, supra note 2, § 2.9.
9. For purposes of this paper, "PSA" is defined as a prospective student-athlete who is not yet
enrolled in college. This paper focuses on the proposed regulations for pre-enrollment and will not
discuss any proposed changes for post-enrollment regulations.
10. Steve Wieberg, Div. II Opens Its Doors to Ex-pros; D-I Not Ready, USA TODAY, Jan. 9,
2001, at 5C.
11. News Release, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Division II Approves Preenrollment
Amateurism Legislation, available at
http://www.ncaa.orgreleases/makepage.egi/divii/2001010901d2.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
12. NCAA Division II Amateurism Deregulation: Overview, NCAA.ORG [hereinafter NCAA
Division II Overview], available at http:llwww.ncaa.org/news/2001/200101 15/active/3802nO3.html
(last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
Division I's former Bylaws state that an athlete will lose amateur status if he:
(a) Uses his ... athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport; (b) Accepts a
promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following completion of intercollegiate athletics
participation; (c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional athletics, regardless of
its legal enforceability or any consideration received; (d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary,
reimbursement of expenses or any other form of financial assistance from a professional sports
organization based on athletics skill or participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and regulations;
(e) Competes on any professional athletics team and knows (or had reason to know) that the team is a
professional athletics team... , even if no pay or renumeration for expenses was received; or (f) Enters
into a professional draft or an agreement with an agent.
NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 2000-01 NCAA DmvISION II MANUAL § 12.1.1 (2000)
[hereinafter NCAA DIVISION H MANUAL].
13. NCAA Division II Overview, supra note 12, available at
http:llwww.ncaa.orglnewsl2001/20010115/active/3802n03.html.
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contract, rules dealing with these types of situations should be "liberalized."' 14
A final justification for its move was that by changing its Bylaws, the NCAA
would be able to treat foreign and domestic participants equally. 15
C. Division II's Plan
Under Division II's new Bylaws, after graduating from high school a PSA
can play professionally, sign a professional contract, and even accept prize
money from competition. 16 However, for each year that the PSA participates
professionally or accepts prize money, one year of college eligibility is lost.17
In addition, if and when the PSA decides to enter college, he must sit out the
first year while attending classes in order to become eligible for intercollegiate
participation.' 8  Therefore, a PSA has a three-year window to play
professionally and still retain eligibility. The new Bylaws state that this
window begins when, at the PSA's "first opportunity" to enroll in college after
graduating from high school, the PSA participates in "organized
competition." '9 If a PSA chose to play professionally for three years, the PSA
would only have one year of eligibility remaining.
Division II believed that by enacting these Bylaws it, as well as the PSA,
would be better off. The advantages achieved would be that: 1) the NCAA
would "no longer have to determine if a PSA is a professional or amateur;" 20
2) "[t]he supported changes would allow a PSA to make a more informed
decision in that the consequences for choosing to participate in organized
competition after high school are stated clearly;" 21 and 3) by causing the PSA
to lose a year of eligibility for each year he participates professionally, and
then requiring the student-athlete to sit out the first year of college enrollment,
the PSA "is showing a clear and informed commitment to pursue
academics." 22 The latter of these advantages reiterates the connection between
college athletics and education, which, as will be discussed later, is key to the
NCAA's defense against antitrust suits.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Organized competition is defined the same as professional competition. The two will be
used interchangeably throughout this article.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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II. DIVISION I'S PROPOSALS-A MODIFIED APPROACH
A. The Proposals
Division I's current definition for an amateur athlete is identical to
Division II's former definition.23 However, while the original Division I
proposals were very similar to the newly enacted Bylaws of Division 11,24 the
NCAA Academics/Eligibility/Compliance (AEC) Cabinet amended the
proposals because of concerns raised by members of Division 1,25 such as
athletic directors, coaches, and conference commissioners. 26 Because of the
amendments, a very different rule than that passed by Division II is now under
consideration. While Division II will allow a PSA to participate in
professional competition for. up to three years after high school graduation,27
the amended Division I amateur deregulation proposals only allow a PSA to
participate in organized athletics for one year or less.28 Nonetheless, Division
I, similar to Division II, would still require the PSA to complete an "academic
year in residence" before gaining eligibility.29 Other lesser changes include
removing both men's and women's basketball from the proposals for two
years3" and not allowing high school athletes to receive compensation for
participation in a sport until after graduating from high school if their high
school sponsors the sport.31  Other than these differences, Division I's
amended proposals closely mirror those overwhelmingly approved by
23. Compare NCAA DMSION I MANUAL, supra note 2, § 12.1.1; with NCAA DIVISION II
MANUAL, supra note 12, § 12.1.1.
24. Compare NCAA DIVISION I PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 5-10, with NCAA Division 11
Amateurism Deregulation: Draft Legislation, NCAA.ORG, available at
http://www.ncaa.orglagents-anateurism/amateurisnil2/amateurism-draft.html.
25. These concerns are addressed later in this article.
26. AEC Cabinet Amends Amateurism Package, NCAA NEWS, Mar. 12, 2001 [hereinafter AEC
Cabinet], available at http://www.ncaa.orglnews/2001/20010312/active/3806nOl.html. See also Gary
T. Brown, Division I Delegates Say More Con Than Pro on Amateurism Package, NCAA NEWS, Jan.
15, 2001, available at http://www.ncaa.org/news/2001/20010115/active/3802n03.html.
27. NCAA Division 1I Overview, supra note 12, available at
http:llwww.ncaa.orglagents-amateurism/amateurism/2/overview.html.
28. AEC Cabinet, supra note 26, available at
http:/www.ncaa.org/news/2001/20010312/active/3806n01.html.
29. Id.
30. Id. See also Gary T. Brown, Councils Set Stage for Policy Changes in Each Division, NCAA
NEWS, Apr. 23, 2001, available at http:lwww.ncaa.orglnews/2001/20010423/active/3809nOl.html.
The AEC Cabinet determined that the issues men's and women's basketball were faced with were
unique and therefore required more time to "develop appropriate measures for that sport." Id.
31. Id.
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Division 11.32
B. The Purpose Behind the Proposals
Division I's reasoning behind its proposals is two-fold. First, the
proposals are intended to reaffirm "the link between education and sport. 33
By doing so, Division I seeks to "maintain a commitment to 'what is best for
the prospective student-athlete,"' 34 and allow itself to approach amateurism
"without compromising [its] commitment to education." 35 Division I feels
that a PSA's goal should be to obtain a college education and that a PSA
should stay on a path to do so. 36 Christine Grant, former chairperson of the
Division I AEC Cabinet's Agents and Amateurism subcommittee, stated that
an amateur athlete is one "who is pursuing an education as a first priority and
who is participating in sport as an avocation." 37 She further explained that
receiving money does not make a person a better athlete, but rather the
"competitive experience you've had when you're not doing anything but
sport. '38 However, under the proposals if the PSA strays from that path, then
he suffers the consequence of losing at least some eligibility. 39 In addition,
Division I attempts to open the doors of intercollegiate sports to others while
still tackling competitive inequity, which the NCAA feels is the "true concern
of amateurism." 40
Second, Division I attempts to correct some of the difficulties caused by
its current rules. Some of the internal problems that are trying to be resolved
include the difficulty of investigating PSAs prior to enrollment, the difficulty
of tracking the preenrollment activities of domestic PSAs, and even more so,
foreign PSAs, and the fact that current NCAA rules penalize PSAs for actions
32. Division I's proposals also include certain exceptions for ice hockey and recruiting minor
league baseball players. NCAA DIVISION I PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 6, 10. Ice hockey players
would be permitted to play on USA Hockey or Canadian Hockey Association teams, excluding Major
Junior A teams for up to two years after high school without losing any eligibility. Id. at 6. College
baseball coaches would not be allowed to recruit a PSA who is playing minor league baseball unless
that PSA initiates the first contact. Id. at 10.
33. Id. at 2.
34. Id. at 1.
35. Id.
36. See generally id.
37. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, Grant Has Been a Champion of Amateurism
Deregulation, NCAA NEWS, May 21, 2001, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/news/2001/20010521/active/3811 n06.html.
38. Id.
39. NCAA DIVISION I PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 2-3.
40. Id. at 3.
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that do not give them a competitive advantage. 41
C. Fears of Divi'sion I Membership
As stated above, the original proposals set out by Division I were nearly
identical to those passed by Division II. However, at its annual conference,
many Division I members, including athletic directors and conference
commissioners, expressed concerns over the amateur deregulation proposals.42
One concern was the creation of a third party relationship between players and
coaches, which may result when a player's professional team decides that the
player's best interest would be to play collegiately, then pay for that athlete's
tuition, by allowing PSAs to "pay for play."43 Another concern was that the
proposals would force high school athletic associations to enact new
regulations to protect high school athletes that the associations may not have
the ability to enforce. 44 The Division I AEC Cabinet responded to these
concerns by amending the amateur deregulation proposals to include the
provisions mentioned above.
While the NCAA may very well have good intentions with its proposals,
by changing its definition of "amateurism," there may be some risks involved.
This paper now changes its focus to what the consequences may be should
Division I pass their amateurism deregulation proposals.
III. Two LEGAL THEORIES FOR THE NCAA TO BE CONCERNED WITH
Over the past decade, with more and more universities and colleges
recruiting foreign athletes, the NCAA has run into problems determining
athletes' eligibility.45 Because some athletes are recruited overseas and
41. Id. at 4. See also Fred Delcomyn, Guest Editorial-Let's Give Amateurism Deregulation a
Chance, NCAA NEWS, Feb. 26, 2001 (noting that deregulating amateurism will help simplify NCAA
rules), available at http:/www.ncaa.orglnew/2001/20010226/comment.html; David Goldfield,
Comment-Proposals Alleviate Hypocrisy in Athletics, NCAA NEws, Mar. 26, 2001, available at
http://www.ncaa.orglnews/2001/20010326/Commenthtml. Goldfield is in favor of deregulation
because of the opportunities that PSAs can benefit from if they are allowed to try their hand in
professional sports. He states that "[tihe chance to fail is one of the greatest gifts we can give to
youngsters because imbedded in that is also the chance that they might succeed." Id.
42. Brown, supra note 26, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/news/2001/20010115/active/3802n03.html.
43. Id.
44. Id. See also Robert F. Kanaby, Comment-Proposals Spur Concern Among High Schools,
NCAANEWs, Jan. 1, 2001, available at http:llncaa.orgfnews/2001/20010101/commenthtml.
45. NCAA Division II Overview, supra note 12, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/agents-amateurism/amateurism/2/overview.html. See also NCAA DmsiON I
PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 4.
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receive money from teams who do not consider it payment for participation,
the NCAA often has difficulty determining the eligibility of foreign PSAs.4
6
This has led to many legal battles, all of which have been won by the NCAA.
However, in 2001, the NCAA had its closest call, nearly losing an important
legal battle over the eligibility of a foreign athlete.
Muhammed Lasege was a 6-foot 11-inch center from Nigeria who signed
a letter-of-intent with the University of Louisville. Before coming to the
United States, however, Lasege participated on what the NCAA considered to
be a professional team, where he received a minimal amount of
compensation.47 The NCAA alleged that he not only signed a professional
contract, but also was represented by an agent, and for that reason determined
that Lasege was ineligible.48 Lasege brought a lawsuit against the NCAA
alleging "arbitrary" decision making by the NCAA.49 A Kentucky Circuit
Court held in favor of Lasege and granted an injunction permitting him to
play.50 The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, noting that
there have been similar instances where the NCAA reinstated an athlete's
eligibility.51 Nonetheless, a highly divided Kentucky Supreme Court reversed,
and upheld the NCAA's determination.52
Lasege is a classic example of the type of difficult situation the NCAA is
faced with when determining a PSAs initial eligibility. The NCAA itself
admits that its amateurism Bylaws are currently inconsistent53 and has had
difficulty determining the eligibility of PSAs.54 It uses these inconsistencies
and difficulties as reasons for its amateurism deregulation proposals.55
46. Id.
47. Christine Vasconez, Player's Twisting Journey Ends in Court, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar.
15, 2001, at 6A.
48. Id.
49. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Lasege, No. 2001-CA-000048-I, slip op. at 2 (Ky. Ct. App.
Feb. 6, 2001) (order denying interlocutory relief). See also Eric Crawford, Attorneys Grilled in
Lasege Hearing: U of L Player's Eligibility at Issue, COURIER-J. (Louisville, KY), Feb. 6, 2001, at
1D.
50. Lasege, No. 2001-CA-000048-I, slip op. at 1.
51. Id. at2-3.
52. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d 77, 89 (Ky. 2001).
53. NCAA DIVISION I PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 4. See also Alexander Wolff, Scorecard: Hit
the Road, Jacques, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 10, 2001, at 29. In his article, Wolff notes that the
NCAA's inconsistency has only gotten worse. He uses Duke University's Carlos Boozer as an
example, who, along with other members of Team USA's World Championship for Young Men
team, collected $5000.00. Conversely, the NCAA has denied eligibility to foreign athletes who
"received compensation from club teams back home," or suspended those foreign athletes who play
with professionals. Id.
54. NCAA DIVISION I PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 4.
55. Id.
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Although men's basketball is not currently included in Division I's amateur
deregulation proposals, if it were, the fact that Lasege signed a contract, as
long as an agent was never involved, would not have mattered. He would
have been eligible to participate in Division I athletics under the proposals.
In this section, this article discusses two legal theories-the law of private
associations and antitrust law-through which lawsuits have been and could
potentially be brought against the NCAA's amateurism eligibility proposals.
Included in this discussion will be an analysis of important court holdings in
cases involving each theory. Finally, this section will conclude with the
introduction of a hypothetical, which will be used to show the impact the
amateur deregulation proposals may have.
A. The Law of Private Associations
The United States Supreme Court has held that the NCAA is not a state
actor.56 Therefore, the NCAA, made up of over 1000 members, 57 is a private
association. As such, judicial review of its decisions comes under only very
limited circumstances. 58 Generally speaking, courts will only overturn the
decisions of a private association if it is proven that such decisions are made
arbitrarily and capriciously or are procedurally unfair.59
The NCAA has not been immune to such cases. 60 For example, in Lasege,
mentioned above, Muhammed Lasege sought an injunction against the NCAA
barring him from playing at the University of Louisville. Lasege alleged three
things: 1) that the NCAA's denial of his eligibility was arbitrary because it
was inconsistent with other situations where student-athletes "had their
eligibility restored after signing professional contracts and receiving benefits
under those contracts,' 61 2) "that the 'sports agency contract' did not actually
56. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988).
57. Welch Suggs, NCAA President Proposes Broad Plan for Reforms, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Jan. 19, 2001, at A37.
58. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Brinkworth, 680 So. 2d 1081, 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996).
59. See generally Found. for Interior Design Educ. Research v. Savannah Coll. of Art & Design,
39 F. Supp. 2d 889 (W.D. Mich. 1998), affd, 244 F.3d 521 (2001); New Orleans Pelicans Baseball,
Inc. v. National Ass'n of Prof'l Baseball Leagues, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21468 (E.D. La.
1994); Crane v. Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 975 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1992).
60. Brinkvworth, 680 So. 2d at 1083. Here, a University of Miami student-athlete alleged that the
NCAA acted "arbitrarily and unfairly" when it denied his application for a sixth year of eligibility.
Id. The trial court granted Brinkworth an injunction that allowed him to play. Id. However, on
appeal, the Florida Court of Appeals reversed and held that it did not have the authority to review the
NCAA's decision, stating: "It is up to the NCAA to interpret its own rules, not the judiciary." Id. at
1084.
61. Lasege, No. 2001-CA-000048-I, slip op; at 2-3.
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create an agency relationship," 62 and 3) that if an injunction was denied,
Lasege would face "serious potential harm," such as loss of scholarship,
education, and opportunity, along with possible deportation.
63
After noting that Lasege did not have a constitutional right to play
intercollegiate athletics, the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated that he had the
right to be treated fairly and have his "eligibility determined in a matter
consistent with other individuals similarly situated." 64  Based on these
findings, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Circuit Court's holding and
denied the NCAA's motion to have the injunction set aside. 65
However, on June 14, 2001, a divided Kentucky Supreme Court, by a 4-3
decision, reversed the appellate court's holding. 66 The reasons given by the
majority, along with the dissenting opinion's stem language, show exactly
how close the NCAA came to losing this case and being dealt a devastating
blow.
The majority held "that the trial court abused its discretion by: (1)
substituting its judgment for that of the NCAA on the question of Lasege's
intent to professionalize; [and] (2) finding that the NCAA has no interest in
this case which weighs against injunctive relief. ... ,,67 Further, the court held
that the appellate court erred by not reversing the trial court's decision, even
though doing so requires the trial court to have "made clearly erroneous
findings unsupported by substantial evidence."68
While the majority's decision was made purely on procedural grounds, in
a very sternly written dissent, Chief Justice Johnstone strongly believed that
the trial court had heard all arguments, and after weighing each side's
argument, came to a conclusion of law that was supported by the evidence.
69
He then stated: "I would agree that there has been a substitution of judgment
in this case, but it has been the majority substituting its judgment for the trial
judge." 70
From this language, combined with the fact that the court was split 4-3, it
can easily be seen that the NCAA was very fortunate to have won. The
NCAA has, on the other hand, consistently won cases brought against it under
62. Id. at 3.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id. at 3.
66. Lasege, 53 S.W.3d at 89.
67. Id. at 84.
68. Id
69. Id. at 90-91 (Johnstone, J. dissenting).
70. Id at 91 (Johnstone, J. dissenting).
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antitrust law.
B. Antitrust Law
While the law of private associations has been used in some cases against
the NCAA, antitrust law has emerged as the law of choice for parties seeking
relief from NCAA actions. The remaining portion of this section discusses
antitrust law and gives an overview of the cases brought against the NCAA
under the Sherman Act.
1. The Sherman Act and its interpretation
In 1890, realizing that competitive markets were better for consumers,
Congress passed the Sherman Act, designed with the intent to protect and
further competition. 71 At first glance, the Sherman Act broadly prohibits
"[e]very contract, combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States .... 72 However, realizing that there are
many instances where contracts or combinations restrain trade, courts have
developed the law into a two-pronged concept, using either a "per se"
approach or the "rule of reason." 73
Applying the Sherman Act first requires the plaintiff to establish that he
has standing to bring such a claim.74 This can be done by showing an
"antitrust injury" 75 that is "direct."'76 In order to accomplish this, the plaintiff
must first show that there was an agreement among parties to restrain trade.77
Next, the plaintiff must show that the restraint in question involves
commercial activity, 78 and that he has suffered economic harm because of the
restraint.79  The plaintiff then must show that the alleged restraint is
71. Brown v. Pro Football, 50 F.3d 1041, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that Congress' intent in
passing the Sherman Act was to promote competitiveness). This paper will limit itself to section one
of the Sherman Act, which relates to restraints of trade.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
73. Peter C. Carstensen & Paul Olszowka, Antitrust Law, Student-Athletes, and the NCAA:
Limiting the Scope and Conduct of Private Economic Regulation, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 545, 571
(1995).
74. Id. at 568-569.
75. Id. at 568 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977)).
76. Id. (citing Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
77. Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 822 (1998).
78. Goldman, supra note 1, at 215.
79. Carstensen & Olszowka, supra note 73, at 568.
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unreasonable. 80
There are two ways to determine whether a defendant's conduct
unreasonably restrains trade. 81 First, under the per se approach, a defendant's
conduct will be found to violate the Sherman Act if it is "entirely void of
redeeming competitive rationales." 82  If the court decides the conduct in
question falls under the per se approach, there is no need to look into any
positive impact on the market or procompetitive effects. 83 However, the
Supreme Court has expressed reluctance to "impose a bright line per se
rule." 84 Instead, even if what are commonly thought of as per se violations
exist, such as horizontal restraints and cartels, if those restraints are essential
to the industry in order for the product to be available, courts will apply the
rule of reason.85
Under the rule of reason, there are three steps used to determine whether a
restraint is unreasonable. First, the plaintiff must show that an anticompetitive
effect exists. 86 The plaintiff can establish this either directly by showing that
the defendant had control over output or price, 87 or indirectly "by proving that
the defendant possessed the requisite market power within a defined
market." 88  If the indirect route is chosen, the plaintiff should define the
market as narrowly as possible to ensure that the defendant has sufficient
market power.89
If the plaintiff successfully shows that an unreasonable restraint exists, the
burden then shifts to the defendant, who must prove that the restraint in
question actually provides a procompetitive effect.90 As long as the defendant
80. Id. See also Goldman, supra note I, at 225.
81. Law, 134 F.3d at 1016.
82. Id. (quoting SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 515 U.S. 1152 (1995)).
83. Id.
84. Carstensen & Olszowka, supra note 73, at 573 (citing Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian
Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988), overruled by Astoria Entm't, Inc. v. Edwards, 159 F. Supp. 2d 303
(E.D. La. 2001); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Am. Soc'y
of Mech. Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Am. Med'I
Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), affd, 455 U.S. 676 (1982)).
85. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101-03 (1984).
86. Lmv, 134 F.3d at 1019.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 (1984). The courts have generally held
that anything less than 30% market share is insufficient to show market power in a Sherman Act
section 1 case. Id. at 26-27.
90. Law, 134F.3dat 1019.
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succeeds here, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who is required to show
that a "less restrictive means" exists to accomplish the same economic effect,
or that "the challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve the
legitimate objectives .... -91 If both parties successfully meet their burdens of
proof, the fact finder must then weigh each argument to determine the
reasonableness of the "challenged behavior."92
2. Antitrust law applied to the NCAA
Although plaintiffs have had difficulty establishing that the NCAA's
player eligibility rules involve commercial activity,93 the NCAA is no stranger
to antitrust litigation. Its history in this context began in 1974 when a
company that assisted PSAs find athletic scholarships brought an antitrust suit
alleging that the NCAA's "no agent" rule violated sections one and two of the
Sherman Act.94 Nonetheless, the court held that since the NCAA's rule was
designed "to promote amateurism in college sports as it relates to education on
a national scale,"95 the antitrust rules did not apply because this was not a
commercial activity. 96
Since 1974, the NCAA has faced various antitrust challenges to its rules,
none more famous than the Supreme Court's 1984 ruling in NCAA v. Board of
Regents.97 The Court was forced to decide whether the NCAA's limitation on
the number of college football games that could be televised in a season
violated the Sherman Act. The Court first held that although the NCAA was,
in effect, a cartel, its horizontal price fixing structure was essential to its ability
to provide intercollegiate athletics, and therefore, used the rule of reason.98 In
its decision, the Court then indicated that the NCAA had two key defenses to
an antitrust claim. First, the Court stated that the "preservation... of...
amateurism" and "academic tradition" of college athletics were
procompetitive effects.99 Secondly, the Court recognized that "maintaining a
competitive balance among amateur athletic teams" was also a valid
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Smith v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 139 F.3d 180, 185-86 (3d Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, 524 U.S. 982 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 872 (1998).
94. Collegiate Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1975-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 60,117 (D.N.J. 1974), afd, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974).
95. Id. 65,266.
96. Id. 65,267.
97. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
98. Id. at 101-03.
99. Id. at 101.
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procompetitive effect. 100 It is important to note that while the Court made
these findings in dicta, the NCAA has since used these procompetitive effects
in defending antitrust cases brought against it. Nonetheless, the Court held
that the NCAA's restraint was indeed a violation of the Sherman Act since
none of these defenses related to the limitation imposed upon the number of
games to be televised.10 1
While Board of Regents is the most recognized challenge to the NCAA's
rules, the NCAA has been faced with other antitrust challenges relating to its
rules on amateurism, winning each one. 102 The first of these challenges arose
in Jones v. NCAA, 103 where a hockey player that played five years of Canadian
"[A]mateur" Hockey sought an injunction allowing him to play collegiately
after the NCAA deemed him to be ineligible since he received payments from
the team. 104 The court concluded that the Sherman Act did not apply to the
NCAA since the plaintiff was not a competitor, and therefore, could not bring
a claim. 10 5 Nonetheless, the court still went through a Sherman Act section
one and two analysis and concluded that such a claim would fail first because
no group boycott existed, and second because the NCAA's purpose was to
promote amateurism and not to create a restraint from allowing students to
participate in intercollegiate athletics. 106
Following Jones is a wide array of cases, all of which come to the same
general conclusion-courts will give a great deal of deference to the NCAA
when the case involves the NCAA's eligibility rules. 107 For example, in
Justice v. NCAA 108 several University of Arizona football players alleged that
the NCAA acted concertedly when it banned the university's football team
100. Id. at 117.
101. Id. at 120.
102. See generally Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1975); Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977); Justice v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983); McCormack v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Gaines v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 977 F.2d
1081 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 908 (1993); Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conf., 101 F.3d 1315
(9th Cir. 1996); Tanaka v. University of S. Cal., No. SACV99-663-GTH, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18618 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 1999).
103. 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
104. Id. at 297.
105. Id. at 303. The court also recognized the NCAA as a state actor, a ruling that was
subsequently changed in Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 199.
106. Jones, 392 F. Supp. at 304.
107. See generally Justice, 577 F. Supp. 356; McCormack, 845 F.2d 1338; Gaines, 746 F. Supp.
738; Banks, 977 F.2d 1081.
108. 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983).
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from playing in a postseason bowl game.109 The court held that the NCAA's
sanctions were "directly related to the NCAA objectives of preserving
amateurism and promoting fair competition," 110 and therefore were reasonable
restraints. 111 Similarly in Gaines v. NCAA, 112 the court held that an NCAA
rule declaring an athlete who entered a professional draft ineligible was a
reasonable restraint since its intention was to further the NCAA's goal of
"retain[ing] a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports."1 13  Finally, in Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference,114
which dealt with the sanctions imposed on the University of Washington by
the Pacific 10 Conference, the court went through a rule of reason analysis and
ultimately held that the sanctions imposed on the university outweighed any
anticompetitive effect since the plaintiffs failed to show any less restrictive
means. 
115
However, many of the courts in these earlier cases found that NCAA
eligibility rules were not subject to antitrust laws because they "have 'purely
or primarily noncommercial objectives,"" 6 and therefore only go through rule
of reason analyses in dicta. As will be shown later in this paper, the courts
may not be able to ignore the commercial impact of these rules much longer.
For reasons to be discussed in the following section of this article, it is
important to summarize what have been recognized as the NCAA's key
defenses to antitrust suits. First, as Board of Regents and Gaines noted, as
long as the NCAA's rules are created to preserve amateurism by "retain[ing] a
clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports," 117 such rules serve a procompetitive effect. In addition to this,
protecting the "unique atmosphere of competition between 'student-
athletes"', 118 and the "integrat[ion] [of] athletics with academics" 119 have been
recognized as strong defenses against federal antitrust claims. Finally, courts
have recognized the concept of maintaining competitive balance as a valid
109. Id. at360.
110. Id. at 382.
111. Id. at382-83.
112. 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
113. Id. at 744 (quoting NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 2, §§ 1.2-1.3).
114. 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1996).
115. Id. at 1319.
116. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 744 (citing McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343).
117. Id. (quoting NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 2, §§ 1.2-1.3).
118. Id.
119. McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1345.
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defense for the NCAA. 120
IV. LIBERALIZING AMATEURISM
From the examples above, it is clear that the NCAA's rules on amateurism
have frequently been challenged. Nonetheless, the NCAA's defense has been
successful. Because of the difficulty in determining eligibility and the
inconsistency of its eligibility rules, Division I is attempting to ensure that
lawsuits involving these rules no longer occur by enacting its amateur
deregulation proposals. However, because of the amendments made to the
original proposals, Division I's goals may not be met. As will be seen in the
following examples, there may still be difficulties and inconsistencies in
determining a PSA's eligibility under Division I's proposals.
A. The "Amateur" Soccer Player
According to Division I's amateurism deregulation proposals, as amended,
any PSA that plays up to one full season of organized athletics after graduating
from high school still retains three years of eligibility. 12 1 In addition, for the
first year that the PSA attends college, the PSA "must fulfill an academic year
in residence"'122 and not participate in intercollegiate athletics. It follows that
if a PSA plays on an organized team for one full season and then decides to
attend college, as long as the PSA sits out the first year, the PSA can receive a
scholarship and play intercollegiate athletics for three seasons. 123
The same cannot be said, however, about a PSA who plays organized
athletics for more than one season. It must first be made clear how such a
scenario could take place. Considering that Division I excluded men's and
women's basketball from its amended proposals, 124 to show a possible claim
against the NCAA it would be inappropriate to consider a high school
basketball player who jumps to the NBA, plays two years and then decides to
go to college. It would be equally inappropriate to consider the validity of the
120. Id. at 1344.
121. AEC Cabinet, supra note 26, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/news/2001/20010312/active/3806n01 .html.
122. Id.
123. It is important to note, however, that under Division II's new Bylaws, this PSA would be
able to play organized athletics for up to three seasons, with his eligibility being reduced by one full
year for each year the PSA participates in organized athletics. NCAA Division II Overview, supra
note 12, available at http://www.ncaa.org/agentsamateurism/amateurism/2/overview.html.
124. AEC Cabinet, supra note 26, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/news/2001/20010312/active/3806n01 .html. The NCAA decided to "study the
sport's unique issues and develop appropriate regulations." Id.
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proposals under a scenario involving a high school athlete going directly to the
NFL upon graduation and then trying to enter college because this has never
been done. However, the case of a foreign PSA that graduates from his
country's equivalent to high school and then plays two seasons for an
advanced level "amateur" soccer team is a situation in which potential
problems may arise. Similar to Lasege, such a PSA may receive some benefits
that the NCAA could find to be improper, although the PSA may not be aware
of such a determination. Examples of possible benefits may include housing
or competition with professionals.
Under Division I's amended amateurism deregulation proposals, if the
NCAA would find that the PSA indeed received some form of improper
payments or benefits, this PSA, because he played longer than the allowed one
season, could possibly lose all eligibility and be unable to compete in
intercollegiate sports. However, by the time the NCAA made its
determination, the PSA may have already accepted a scholarship offer or even
began collegiate competition. Comparatively, the same PSA would still be
eligible to compete at the Division II level for two seasons as long as the PSA
does not participate in intercollegiate athletics during the first year, while
attending classes throughout that year. Such an athlete, if of Division I
caliber, may feel slighted and for one reason or another choose to bring a
lawsuit against the NCAA and attempt to regain Division I eligibility through
an injunction by bringing a claim under either the law of private associations
or antitrust law.
The following is an analysis of exactly this situation. Now that a legal
foundation has been established, applying the two legal theories to Division I's
proposals, as well as a comparison to the new Bylaws enacted by Division II,
is necessary to see what benefit the NCAA may gain by liberating amateurism
as well as what consequences and problems may arise. This section analyzes
this scenario under each legal theory according to Division I's amended
amateurism deregulation proposals and then compares this result to the likely
result under Division II's new Bylaws.
B. Law of Private Associations
As the court noted in Lasege and based on the NCAA's own findings,
determining a foreign PSA's eligibility can be a difficult task that may result
in inconsistent findings. 125 If Division I's amateurism deregulation proposals
125. Lasege, No. 2001-CA-00048-I, slip op. at 2-3. See also NCAA Division II Overview, supra
note 12, available at http:llwww.ncaa.org/news/2001/20010115/active/3802nO3.html; NCAA
DMsION I PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 4.
2002]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
were enacted, the chance of such a case being brought against the NCAA
would be somewhat diminished. This is because the proposals would not
require the NCAA to determine whether the PSA is an amateur or a
professional.126 As long as the PSA did not participate in organized athletics
for over a year or have agent representation, the PSA would be eligible to
participate in intercollegiate athletics. 127 In this sense, enacting the proposals
would be a wise move for the NCAA.
However, some questions may exist in the case of the soccer player
described above. This athlete may indeed have received minimal housing
expenses, a per diem and other "living expenses," which may be difficult for
the NCAA to discover. As has been shown in the past, the NCAA has had
difficulty determining the eligibility of athletes in this situation. Such a
scenario could put the NCAA in the same position as it was in Lasege, where
both the trial and appellate courts held that the NCAA acted arbitrarily in
determining Lasege's eligibility. 128
In this sense, Division I's proposals do not solve the problem they
originally intended to. The main reason behind the proposal was to create a
rule for the NCAA, its member schools, and athletes to follow so that
determining eligibility would become much easier. However, by limiting the
proposals to PSAs who play just one season of organized athletics, the NCAA
keeps the door open for potential claims against it. Meanwhile, although the
same problems could arise under the Division II rule, which gives a PSA up to
three years to play organized athletics, it would be more unlikely for such a
suit because after three years, it would be easier to determine whether or not
the PSA had an intent to professionalize.
Based on this discussion, it appears as if the NCAA may alleviate some of
the headaches it has faced in determining a PSA's eligibility if it passed its
proposals. By doing so, it would eliminate potential inconsistencies in its
rulings. For that reason, bringing suit against the NCAA under the law of
private associations would be much more difficult because it would be harder
to argue that the NCAA's decisions were "arbitrary and capricious."
However, while more liberal, the new Division II Bylaw may be even more
useful to prevent any further allegations of arbitrary decision-making.
Nonetheless, the NCAA's primary concern regarding its proposals is found
within the Sherman Act.
126. NCAA DIVISION I PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 4.
127. NCAA Division ii Overview, supra note 12, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/agentsamateurism/amateurism/2/overview.html; NCAA DIVISION I
PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 2-3.
128. Lasege, No. 2001-CA-00048, at 2-3.
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C. Antitrust Law
As discussed above, the NCAA has been faced with antitrust challenges to
its amateurism rules in the past, winning each of them. The amateurism
deregulation proposals, however, bring more questions into what could
become an area of concern for the NCAA. The remainder of this section will
discuss how a potential suit could be brought against the NCAA under
antitrust law and the possible outcomes. First, an analysis using Division I's
proposals will be given. Next, a discussion and evaluation of the strength of
each of the NCAA's recognized defenses to antitrust will be given under
Division I's proposals. This paper then discusses the strength of a PSA's
argument that the way Division I intends to accomplish its intended goals is
overly restrictive. To do so, a comparison between these results and those of a
suit being brought under Division 11's new Bylaws will be made to show any
differences.
1. Bringing the suit under Division I's amateurism deregulation proposals
In order to successfully bring a claim against the NCAA, a plaintiff must
"prove that the NCAA (1) participated in an agreement that (2) unreasonably
restrained trade in the relevant market." 129 Applying these requirements to the
"amateur" soccer player discussed above, in order to bring an antitrust claim
involving Division I's amateurism deregulation proposals, the PSA must first
show that there was a concerted action by the NCAA. Because the NCAA is
comprised of its member schools, if Division I would approve its proposals, a
PSA would have no difficulty showing that concerted action exists. This is
similar to what occurred in Law, where Division I passed a Bylaw that
restrained the salaries of entry-level coaches. 130 In that case, because the
members of Division I passed the disputed Bylaw, the NCAA did not dispute
that an agreement among its members existed.131
A PSA must then be able to show that the disputed rule involves
commercial activity. As evidenced by a variety of cases, this could very well
be the most difficult portion of the PSA's claim since some courts in the past
have held that the NCAA's eligibility rules were not believed to be involved in
interstate commerce.1 32 However, given the Ninth Circuit's holding in NCAA
v. Miller,133 it is clear that the NCAA is involved in interstate commerce.1 34
129. Lav, 134 F.3d at 1016.
130. Id. at 1012.
131. Id.at 1016.
132. Smith, 139 F.3d at 185-186.
133. 10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993).
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In Miller, the court held that the NCAA's dealings in interstate commerce
include marketing intercollegiate competitions, 135 "transportation of teams
across state lines,"'136 overseeing nationwide recruiting, 137 and controlling
national broadcast bids for its major sporting events. 138 In addition, it can be
argued that NCAA member schools compete against each other for athletes'
services, and therefore are involved in commercial activity. 139 In this sense,
because of the nationwide competition between schools recruiting PSAs,
combined with the value of a full scholarship, 140 the PSA would be able to
show the alleged restraint involved commercial activity. 141
Next, the PSA must show that he suffers economic harm. To do so, the
PSA most likely must have been offered an athletic scholarship that he
accepted. If this PSA played on such an "amateur" team for two seasons, it is
entirely possible that the NCAA may eventually declare him ineligible, even
under its amateur deregulation proposals. However, this determination may
come after the PSA accepted a scholarship offer from the school. Once
accepted, this scholarship creates a contract between the PSA and the
university, 142 and has an economic value attached to it. 143 It follows that if the
NCAA later determines that the PSA is ineligible, the PSA would be able to
argue that his economic harm is the loss of scholarship.
If the PSA is successful in showing that the NCAA acted concertedly in
commercial activity resulting in his economic harm, the PSA then must show
that the restraint in question is unreasonable. As noted above, there are two
ways for a plaintiff to accomplish this, either through the per se rule or the rule
134. Id. at 640.
135. Id. at 638 (citing Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-102).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 10 F.3d at 638.
139. Matthew J. Mitten, University Price Competition for Elite Students and Athletes: Illusions
and Realities, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 59, 61 (1995). See also Goldman, supra note 1, at 215.
140. This value can reach in excess of $30,000.00 (including tuition, room, board, meals and
books). Take, for example, the total cost of one-year's education at the University of North Carolina
and the University of Notre Dame. The in-state cost for tuition, books, fees, etc. (not including
housing) at North Carolina, a public institution, is approximately $7288.00, whereas out-of-state
students pay approximately $22,540.00. Cost and Financial Aid, UNC.EDU, available at
http://www.ais.unc.edu/sis/ssa/cost/ssa-uggeneral.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2002). Comparatively,
Notre Dame, a private institution, costs approximately $33,100.00 for tuition, fees, room, board,
books, personal expenses and transportation. Office of Financial Aid, Cost of Attendance, ND.EDU,
available at www.nd.edu/-finaid/cost-of attendance.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2001).
141. Carstensen & Olszowka, supra note 73, at 581.
142. Hall v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 985 F. Supp. 782, 797-798 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
143. As noted above, this value can reach over $30,000.00. See supra note 140.
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of reason.144 According to the Supreme Court's holding in Board of Regents,
although the NCAA operates as a cartel, it is safe to assume that any alleged
antitrust violation on the part of the NCAA would be viewed under the rule of
reason.
145
The rule of reason would require the PSA to establish that the NCAA
either had control over output or price or that the NCAA had sufficient market
power within the relevant market. 146 It is unlikely that a PSA could show that
the NCAA had control over output or price, so to make an effective claim, the
PSA should seek to establish a market over which the NCAA has significant
power. This could be accomplished if the PSA described the relevant market
as American college soccer. To this extent, it could reasonably be shown that
the NCAA has well over fifty percent of market power. The only other
competitors in this market would be either junior college or National
Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) teams, to which there are not
nearly as many that offer soccer as those that do in the NCAA.147 The NCAA
could counter and argue that the appropriate market is soccer worldwide or
even soccer in America. To each of these, many more opportunities exist than
those simply confined to the college market. For example, soccer worldwide,
even in a true amateur setting would consist of a huge number of
opportunities. Similarly, amateur opportunities in the United States are
plentiful considering the opportunities that exist within various soccer clubs
and other organizations that offer amateur teams, such as the United Soccer
League.
If the PSA is able to establish the relevant market as college soccer within
the United States and succeeds in showing that there is an economic harm, he
satisfies the first step in bringing a successful antitrust claim. The burden
would then shift to the NCAA to show that its disputed regulations have
144. Lmv, 134F.3dat 1016.
145. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101.
146. Lmv, 134 F.3d at 1019.
147. In the NCAA, between Divisions I, II and III there are approximately 725 teams competing
in men's soccer. NCAA Sport Listing by Institution, NCAA.ORG, available at
https://goomer.ncaa.orgrwows?hidden-run-parameters=psport-institution&PSport Code=MSO&
PDIVISION=ALL (last visited Apr. 17, 2001). By comparison, the NAIA has approximately 225
men's soccer teams. E-mail from Scott McClure, Men's Soccer Administrator, NAIA, to Ben Menzel
(Apr. 17, 2001, 10:55 CST) (on file with author). The resulting market share is approximately 81.5%
for the NCAA and 18.5% for the NAIA. If the comparison was limited to just Division I soccer, the
NCAA, which has about 195 Division I men's soccer teams would still have approximately 46.4%
market share. If junior colleges were to be included in this calculation, 179 men's teams would be
added. If all divisions of NCAA men's soccer were included, the NCAA would have a market share
of 64.2%. If only NCAA Division I were included, the NCAA would have market share of 32.5%.
Therefore, regardless of how the NCAA's market share was calculated, they would possess the
requisite market share needed to have market power.
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procompetitive benefits. 148
2. Procompetitive effect
As stated above, the procompetitive effects that have been historically
used by the NCAA are (1) the preservation of amateurism by maintaining the
connection between education and athletics, and (2) sustaining competitive
balance. 149 Taking the amateurism deregulation proposals into consideration,
arguing that both of these still exist may pose problems for the NCAA.
a. Preservation of amateurism
First, it is important to note that the NCAA can, more or less, define
amateurism in whatever way it wants to.150 With this in mind, it could be
reasonably argued that through its amateurism deregulation proposals,
combined with the way in which the NCAA intends to redefine amateurism
(limiting the definition to strictly whether an athlete is paid while in college),
the NCAA continues to preserve amateurism. However, since the courts in
previous cases have used the NCAA's own language of "retain[ing] a clear
line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports,"'' 1 this "clear line" may become a bit blurred.
While a potential claim against the NCAA has thus far been focused on a
foreign soccer player, to illustrate how the NCAA's "clear line" between
amateurism and professionalism will be diminished under Division I's
proposals, consider the result of a minor league baseball player in America
attempting to enter college after failing at the professional level. If that athlete
signs a contract and plays for a minor league team, he is obviously then a
professional baseball player. Yet, under the proposals, the athlete would be
allowed to play at the college level as long as he does not play professionally
for more than one season. Therefore, the "clear line" separating amateur from
professional that the NCAA has so frequently relied on becomes a very gray
line, at best. If the NCAA passes the proposals, this argument will be
weakened and lack the power and effectiveness that it once had.
The "clear line" is blurred even more when trying to link the proposals to
maintaining the connection between education and athletics. Professor
Carstensen has made the argument that changes made in the NCAA's rules on
148. Lmv, 134 F.3d at 1019.
149. See generally Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85.
150. W. Burlette Carter, Student-Athlete Welfare in a Restructured NCAA, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L.
1, 80-81 (2000).
151. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 744.
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eligibility no longer are designed "to achieve the objective of reasonable
education opportunity" 152 but instead are done to control the market.153 He
argues that preservation of amateurism is no longer the goal of the NCAA and
states that the NCAA's goal "has been transformed into a cartel restraining
competition for the benefit of all its members .... 154 Applying this argument
to the proposals makes the NCAA's situation even more tenuous.
Finally, a strong argument could be made that because more and more
PSAs are making the decision to go pro instead of going to college, the quality
of intercollegiate athletics has suffered. By allowing such a PSA to later enter
the collegiate ranks, the NCAA could contend that they are creating a more
competitive environment and actually enhancing the quality of college sports.
However, if an antitrust suit is brought against the NCAA under Division I's
amateur deregulation proposals, an equally, if not more persuasive argument
could be made that the NCAA's intention for deregulating amateurism was for
its own economic interests instead of the student-athlete's educational goals.
For these reasons, while the NCAA's preservation of amateurism defense may
still exist, the strength of this defense has been sufficiently weakened.
b. Competitive balance
The second defense available to the NCAA is that the regulation in
question helps maintain competitive balance within intercollegiate athletics. 155
Courts have recognized this defense in the past when applied to other
situations. 156 However, as will be shown, because the NCAA is willing to
allow PSAs to play organized athletics for a full season, this defense will be
less effective.
. An example of how this defense helped the NCAA can be shown in Banks
v. NCAA, 157 where a student-athlete left college early to enter the NFL draft.
The player subsequently went undrafted and attempted to regain eligibility.
The NCAA denied the athlete's appeal, stating that by declaring for the NFL
draft he forfeited all remaining eligibility.158 The Seventh Circuit upheld the
NCAA's decision, stating that the rule helped "foster fair competition among
152. Carstensen & Olszowka, supra note 73, at 586.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Law, 134 F.3d at 1023-1024.
156. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117. See also Law, 134 F.3d at 1023-1024; Smith, 139 F.3d
at 187.
157. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
158. Id. at 1083-84.
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the participating amateur college students." 159
If the NCAA passes its amateurism deregulation proposals, this defense
may no longer exist for several reasons. First, under the proposals, if the same
athlete mentioned in Banks had played baseball instead of football, entered the
professional ranks after high school and even played professionally, he would
be allowed to compete intercollegiately provided the other requirements of the
proposals are met. The courts may very well be reluctant to find that by
allowing this to happen, the NCAA continues to "foster fair competition."'
160
Second, although Division I would require the PSA to "sit out" a year and take
classes, whether this would minimize any competitive advantage the PSA
gained while playing organized athletics, as the NCAA contends doing so
would, 161 is hard to imagine. An athlete who is able to fully concentrate on
gaining skills in a particular sport will likely be able to retain such skills for
longer than one year. In addition, if the PSA is only barred from
intercollegiate competition, yet is still able to practice with his college team,
the PSA will be even more likely to retain those skills.
3. Less restrictive means
In case a court holds that the NCAA still has procompetitive benefits that
outweigh the anticompetitive effects of the regulation, the PSA could still
make a strong argument that there is a less restrictive way to further the same
goals. Quite simply, the PSA could argue that the one-year limitation placed
on an athlete's ability to participate in organized athletics after high school
graduation is not the least restrictive means available. To this end, the NCAA
may have a hard time rebutting such an argument since its original proposal
was nearly identical to the Bylaws passed by Division 11. 162
a. Antitrust law applied to Division II's Bylaws
As mentioned above, under the Bylaws enacted by Division II, a PSA
would be eligible to participate in organized athletics for up to three years.
163
159. Id. at 1090.
160. Id. (citing Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 382).
161. Division I Amateurism Deregulation: Preenrollment Frequently Asked Questions
[hereinafter FAQs], available at
http://www.ncaa.org/agentsamateurism/amateurism/l/preenrollmentfaqs.html (last visited Jan. 20,
2001).
162. Compare NCAA DIVISION I PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 5, with NCAA Division II
Overview, supra note 12, available at
http://www.ncaa.org/agents-amateurism/amateurism/2/overview.html.
163. NCAA Division II Overview, supra note 12, available at
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For each year the PSA chose to do so, he would lose one year of
intercollegiate eligibility. 164 Once the PSA decided to enroll in college, to be
eligible to participate in intercollegiate athletics, the PSA would have to take
part in a "year in residence" and not compete in intercollegiate athletics.
165
Under these Bylaws, it would be very difficult for a PSA to succeed in an
antitrust claim against the NCAA. First, to bring the suit the PSA would need
to go through the same steps discussed above dealing with the PSA at the
Division I level. However, while the PSA would be able to show the NCAA
had the requisite market power if the accepted market were college soccer,1
66
the PSA would have a hard time rebutting the NCAA's showing of
procompetitive effects. This is because under the Division II Bylaws, while
the NCAA's likely defenses would be the same, even if they are not as strong
as they have been historically, the PSA would have a great deal of difficulty
meeting his final burden of proof-that a less restrictive means of
accomplishing the intended goals exist.
Division II had two goals in mind when enacting its new Bylaws. First,
they sought to rid themselves of the difficulties inherent in determining the
status of PSAs, especially those from other nations. 167 With its new Bylaws,
determining eligibility would be the same for both domestic and foreign
PSAs. 168 The second goal was to give more individuals the opportunity to
pursue a college education. 169 By allowing an athlete who has failed as a
professional to enter college keeps a door open to him that in the past has been
locked shut the instant the athlete shows an intent to play organized
athletics. 170
While these goals are consistent with those of Division I, because Division
II allows a three-year "window of opportunity" for a PSA to enroll in college,
arguing that a less restrictive means exists would be a difficult task. To force
http://www.ncaa.org/agents_amateurism/amateurism/2/overview.html.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. There are approximately 170 colleges and universities that offer men's soccer at the
Division II level. NCAA Sport Listing by Institution, supra note 147, available at
https://goomer.ncaa.org/rwows?hiddenrunjarameters=p sport institution&PSportCode=MSO&
P_DIVISION=ALL. This results in a market share of about 43% for the NCAA, as compared to 57%
for NAIA.
167. NCAA Division 1I Overview, supra note 12, available at
http://www.ncaa.orglagents_amateurismlamateurisml2/overview.html.
168. Id.
169. FAQs, supra note 161, available at
http:llwww.ncaa.orglagents_amateurism/amateurism/l/preenrollment_faqs.html.
170. In this sense, "intent to play professional athletics" includes allowing one's self to be
drafted, signing a contract, or even simply playing on team that has professional athletes.
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the NCAA to allow a PSA who has participated in the professional ranks
greater than three years to play in the same sport intercollegiately, yet still
maintain competitive balance, would most likely be unreasonable in the eyes
of a majority of citizens. Therefore, the Division II's Bylaw allowing this
three-year window would, in all likelihood, be viewed as a reasonable
restraint.
b. Division I's Proposals-Does a less restrictive means exist?
As discussed above, while the NCAA's defenses to an antitrust claim-its
procompetitive effects-still exist, the strength of these defenses under
Division I's amateurism deregulation proposals has been weakened. However,
unlike a PSA alleging that Division II's new Bylaws are unreasonable, and
partially because of the Division II Bylaws themselves, a PSA alleging that the
amateurism deregulation proposals are unreasonable may be able to meet his
final burden of proof by showing that a less restrictive means exists.
Division I's proposals, much different from Division II's Bylaws, only
allow a PSA to play organized athletics for one season. If the PSA enters
college after one season, he is treated the same as under Division II's new
Bylaws. However, if the PSA takes part in organized athletics for more than
one season, the PSA loses all eligibility. A PSA attempting to show that this
one-year restraint is unreasonable can make a strong argument that a less
restrictive means exists. As originally drafted, Division I's amateurism
deregulation proposals called for the same three-year window as was passed
by Division II. 17 1 This shows at least some willingness on the part of Division
I to allow for a more accommodating rule.
D. Tying It All Together
To summarize, if Division I's amateur deregulation proposals are enacted,
unlike years past, a PSA may have a strong case against the NCAA under
antitrust law for the following reasons. First, the competition among NCAA
schools combined with a PSA's accepted scholarship creates economic harm
related to commercial activity. Next, Division I's proposals may significantly
weaken the procompetitive effects the NCAA has historically relied upon to
outweigh any anticompetitive effect. Finally, a PSA may very well be able to
contend that the amended proposals are not the least restrictive means
available. Because the fact finder would have to balance the NCAA's
diminished procompetitive effects against the anticompetitive effects shown
171. NCAA DIVISION I PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 5.
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by the PSA, the NCAA's success in litigation may be in danger.
V. CONCLUSION
In January of 2001, NCAA Division II overwhelmingly approved
proposals deregulating amateurism. The same proposals were considered by
Division I, causing much debate. While Division I amended its rules to be
more stringent than those passed by Division II, it appears as if Division I may
follow the lead of Division II and deregulate amateurism in its own way.
As this paper shows, however, doing so may not be such a good move for
Division I. By deregulating amateurism, Division I may be setting itself up for
attack. While the NCAA has made its proposals with good intentions in mind,
this paper has shown that if passed, these measures may create complications
the NCAA would rather not face. Not only do Division I's amateurism
deregulation proposals fail to rectify the problems the NCAA has had in
determining the eligibility of foreign PSAs, but its recognized defenses to
antitrust law may be weakened because of the proposals, which may result in
further problems down the road.
Courts have previously been more than willing to side with the NCAA in
such disputes. However, as this article has shown, the NCAA would still be
prone to lawsuits under the law of private associations, and may see the
outcome of antitrust suits brought against its eligibility rules turn out much
differently than they have in the past. For this reason, the NCAA may want to
rethink its amended amateurism deregulation proposals and either enact
proposals more similar to those passed by Division II or not deregulate
amateurism at all.
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